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Abstract
We estimate dynamic models of elder-care arrangements using data from the Assets and
Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old Survey. We model the use of institutional care,
formal home health care, care provided by a child, and care provided by a spouse in the
selection of each care arrangement, the primary arrangement, and hours in each arrangement.
Our results indicate that both observed heterogeneity and true state dependence play roles
in the persistence of care arrangements. We ￿nd that positive state dependence (i.e., inertia)
dominates caregiver burnout, and that formal care decisions depend on the cost and quality
of care.
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1997; Spillman and Long, 2007), many families face decisions concerning long-term care
arrangements for disabled elderly relatives. With the assistance of family members, most
notably spouses and adult children, many disabled elderly individuals remain in the com-
munity (Shirey and Summer, 2000). Others rely exclusively on formal home health care or a
combination of formal home health care and informal care provided by relatives and friends
(Mack and Thompson, 2005). Institutional care represents the other major source of care
for this population (Burwell and Jackson, 1994).
Long-term care arrangements have profound economic, social, and psychological impli-
cations. Komisar and Thompson (2007) report that national spending on long-term care
for elderly and disabled individuals exceeded $200 billion in 2005. Medicaid and Medicare
respectively covered approximately 49 and 20 percent of these expenses, while private health
and long-term care insurance covered roughly 7 percent. Individuals and their families ￿-
nanced about 18 percent of long-term care services that year, while the remaining 5 percent
was ￿nanced by other private and public sources (Komisar and Thompson, 2007). Most
informal care provided by family members is unpaid, but the opportunity costs in terms of
foregone earnings, household production, and leisure are often substantial. Moreover, the
provision of informal care can be psychologically burdensome for caregivers (Martin, 2000;
Byrne, et al., 2009, hereafter BGHS), and institutional care often entails high social and
psychological costs for elderly individuals (Macken, 1986).
The aging of the population and the profound implications of care arrangements for
elderly individuals, their families, and society highlight the importance of developing ap-
propriate public policies concerning long-term care arrangements for the elderly. Although
an extensive literature examines families￿long-term care decisions, most studies neglect the
intertemporal dimensions of care. Using data from ￿ve waves of the Assets and Health Dy-
namics Among the Oldest Old Survey collected between 1995 and 2004, we contribute to
the long-term care literature by developing and estimating three dynamic models of families￿
elder care arrangements. These models distinguish among care provided by a spouse, care
provided by an adult child or child-in-law, formal home health care, and institutional care,
while also allowing for the possibility that the elderly individual remains independent. Our
1models capture several dimensions of families￿care arrangements, namely the use of each
potential care arrangement, the selection of the primary care arrangement, and hours in each
potential care arrangement. Our dynamic framework links care arrangements over time by
allowing for state dependence while distinguishing between spurious state dependence due
to observed and unobserved heterogeneity and true state dependence (e.g., due to inertia or
caregiver burnout). For example, our models distinguish between persistence in care arrange-
ments attributable to a family￿ s preferences (e.g., an aversion to institutional care) and true
state dependence stemming from the high costs of transitioning from one care arrangement
to another (e.g., into or out of institutional care). Our results suggest that inertia (i.e.,
positive true state dependence) contributes to persistence in long-term care arrangements,
thus highlighting the importance of a framework that links care arrangements over time.
1 Literature Review
Although predominantly empirical, the long-term care literature o⁄ers several formal eco-
nomic models. Given the complexities inherent in families￿long-term decisions, none of these
models captures all dimensions of decision-making within families. These models vary with
respect to the assumptions concerning family members￿preferences, the number of children
participating in the decision-making process, and the scope of care decisions considered.
Allowing for the possibility that preferences vary across family members, several papers
present game-theoretic models (Sloan, Picone and Hoerger, 1997, hereafter SPH; Hiedemann
and Stern, 1999, hereafter HS; Pezzin and Schone, 1999a, hereafter PSa; Checkovich and
Stern, 2002, hereafter CS; Engers and Stern, 2002, hereafter ES; Brown, 2006; Pezzin, Pollak
and Schone, 2007, hereafter PPS; BGHS). Other models are based on the assumption of
common preferences; for example, Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan (1996) and Stabile, Laporte,
and Coyte (2006) rely on the assumption of a single family utility function. Kotliko⁄ and
Morris (1990) model the parent and child solving separate maximization problems if they live
separately but maximizing a weighted average of their individual utility functions subject to
their pooled budget constraint if they live together. In contrast to our previous work (e.g.,
2HS, ES, BGHS), this paper abstracts from the possibility that family members have di⁄erent
preferences concerning care arrangements in order to focus on the dynamic dimension of care.
Several models accommodate all adult children in the decision-making process (HS; CS;
ES; Van Houtven and Norton, 2004; Brown, 2006; BGHS). Others simplify modeling and/or
estimation by focusing on families that include only one child (Kotliko⁄ and Morris, 1990)
or two adult children (PPS) or by assuming that only one child participates in the family￿ s
long-term care decisions (SPH, PSa). In this paper, we restrict our sample to families with
at most four children, but we treat each child as a potential caregiver.
The models in this literature also vary with respect to the scope of care decisions exam-
ined. Models presented in HS and ES focus on the family￿ s selection of the primary care
arrangement including informal care provided by an adult child, institutional care, or con-
tinued independence. CS and Brown (2006) model the quantity of informal care provided
by each adult child. Similarly, SPH, PSa, Stabile, Laporte, and Coyte (2006), and BGHS
model the provision of informal care and formal home health care. Stabile, Laporte, and
Coyte (2006) distinguish between publicly and privately ￿nanced home health care. Van
Houtven and Norton (2004) model children￿ s provision of informal care and parent￿ s use of
formal care, de￿ned broadly as nursing home care, home health care, hospital care, physician
visits, and outpatient surgery. Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan (1996) and PPS focus on living
arrangements of sick or disabled elderly individuals (e.g., independent living in the commu-
nity or residence in an intergenerational household). Distinguishing among care provided
by a spouse, care provided by an adult child or child-in-law, formal home health care, and
institutional care, this paper examines three dimensions of families￿care arrangements: the
use of each potential mode of care, the selection of the primary care arrangement, and hours
in each arrangement.
Although the provision of elder care is an inherently dynamic process, most of the litera-
ture abstracts from the intertemporal dimensions of care. Exceptions include B￿rsch-Supan,
Kotliko⁄, and Morris (1991) (hereafter BKM), Garber and MaCurdy (1990) (hereafter GM),
Dostie and LØger (2005) (hereafter DL), Heitmueller and Michaud (2006) (hereafter HM),
and Gardner and Gilleskie (2009). Using a framework that accounts for unobserved hetero-
geneity and state dependence, HM explore the causal links between employment and informal
3care of sick, disabled, or elderly individuals over time. In a dynamic model of savings and
Medicaid enrollment decisions, Gardner and Gilleskie (2009) jointly estimate long-term care
arrangements, savings/gifting behavior, insurance coverage, and health transitions. Their
approach incorporates unobserved permanent and time-varying heterogeneity.
The other studies focus on living arrangements of elderly individuals. BKM examine
transitions among living independently, living with adult children, and living in an institu-
tion. GM model transitions from living in the community to residing in a nursing home and
vice versa as well as transitions from one of these two living arrangements to death. Ac-
counting for unobserved heterogeneity as well as state and duration dependence, DL examine
transitions among independent living, cohabitation, nursing home residence, and death.
Following DL, HM, and Gardner and Gilleskie (2009), our models account for unobserved
heterogeneity and state dependence. Distinguishing among care provided by a spouse, care
provided by an adult child or child-in-law, formal home health care, and institutional care,
our models encompass a broader range of care arrangements than those in the existing
literature. Examining three care dimensions of elder care decisions ￿the use of each potential
mode of care, the selection of the primary care arrangement, and hours in each arrangement,
we also provide a richer description of long-term care dynamics.
2 Data
To examine families￿care arrangements over time, we use data from the 1995, 1998, 2000,
2002, and 2004 waves of the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD)/
Health and Retirement (HRS) survey. With an emphasis on the joint dynamics of health
and demographic characteristics, this nationally representative longitudinal survey provides a
particularly rich source of information concerning long-term care arrangements. Selection cri-
teria for the initial AHEAD/HRS survey, conducted in 1993, include age and living arrange-
ments. In particular, this initial wave contains 6047 households with non-institutionalized
individuals aged 70 years or older. However, subsequent waves retain all living respondents,
thus enabling the study of elderly individuals in the community as well as nursing home
4residents. Spouses of respondents are also respondents even if they would not otherwise
qualify on the basis of their own age, thus increasing the sample size for the initial wave to
8222 respondents. Although AHEAD/HRS oversamples Florida residents, this oversampling
introduces no estimation bias assuming that residential location is exogenous. AHEAD/HRS
also oversamples black and Hispanic households.
After excluding observations with missing values for variables used in our analysis, indi-
viduals who participated in only one wave of the survey, individuals who provided inconsis-
tent responses, individuals who married or remarried over the course of the survey, families
with more than four children, and mixed-race couples, our sample consists of 3353 individ-
uals including spouses of original respondents. In addition to 914 married couples (where
each individual represents a respondent), the sample includes 267 unmarried men and 1258
unmarried women. The preponderance of women (nearly two thirds of the sample) and the
higher marriage rates among men (77:4 percent of men compared to 42:1 percent of women)
re￿ ect di⁄erences in life expectancy by gender and age di⁄erences between husbands and
wives. Fifty-three percent of elderly households participate in all ￿ve waves of the survey.
Our models include characteristics that in￿ uence an elderly individual￿ s caregiving needs,
opportunities, and preferences. The need for care may increase with age and activity lim-
itations; accordingly, our models control for the elderly individual￿ s age, problems with
activities of daily living (ADLs), and problems with instrumental activities of daily living
(IADLs). The presence of a spouse may reduce an elderly individual￿ s need for assistance
from adult children or from formal care providers, particularly if the spouse is relatively
young and healthy; thus, our models control for the elderly individual￿ s marital status, the
spouse￿ s age, and the spouse￿ s activity limitations. Since patterns of care may di⁄er for men
and women and across white, black, and Hispanic families, our models control for gender as
well as race/ethnicity. Moreover, to capture potential di⁄erences in care arrangements for
mothers/wives relative to fathers/husbands by race and ethnicity (see Goeree, Hiedemann,
and Stern, 2010), one of our discrete choice models also includes interactions between gender
and race/ethnicity.
Assets are potentially important characteristics that in￿ uence an elderly individual￿ s
caregiving needs and opportunities in that the ability to purchase care may reduce an indi-
5vidual￿ s dependence on relatives. Unfortunately, there are several problems with the asset
data reported in AHEAD. The ￿rst problem concerns large, spurious changes in assets within
families across time due to changes in the survey structure (for details, see Hurd, Juster,
and Smith, 2003 and Juster et al., 2007). Since transitions are very important in a dynamic
model, the large variation in asset changes is problematic. Hill (2006) also ￿nds unreasonable
variation in changes in assets in HRS.2 Second, among wealthier individuals, 1993 assets are
understated by a factor of two. Third, income and asset reports in the second wave are in-
consistent. Fourth, mean assets double between the second and third waves. Fifth, ￿nancial
measures, particularly those related to equity in a second home, are under-reported (Hurd,
Juster, and Smith, 2003; Juster et al., 2007). Finally, income measures are under-reported
or mis-reported (Hurd, Juster, and Smith, 2003). In the absence of good asset and income
data, our models include the elderly individual￿ s educational attainment as a proxy for her
￿nancial resources. We test whether assets, as measured in AHEAD/HRS, a⁄ect family
decisions and explore how best to use the data by conducting Lagrange Multiplier tests.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the respondents for the ￿rst year of data.3 As a
consequence of the exclusion of nursing home residents from the initial wave and the inclusion
of spouses regardless of age, the characteristics of our sample di⁄er from those of a random
sample of individuals aged 72 years and over.4 Respondents range from 49 to 103 years
with a mean of 78 years and a standard deviation of 6 years. On average, the respondents
report di¢ culty with 0:54 activities of daily living (ADL) such as eating, dressing, or bathing.
But the sample displays considerable variation with regard to ADL problems; while some
individuals report no problems with activities of daily living, others report problems with
as many as six ADLs. Similarly, the respondents report an average of 0:43 problems with
instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), such as using a telephone, taking medication,
handling money, shopping, or preparing meals; here too the sample displays considerable
variation, with respondents reporting a range of zero to ￿ve IADL problems. In addition
2 He performs an experiment with later waves of HRS where respondents are told how they answered the
asset questions in the last wave; this results in a signi￿cant reduction in the variance of asset changes.
3 For most respondents, the ￿rst year of data used in our analysis is 1995; for some, it is later.
4 The AHEAD data surveys respondents aged 70 or older in the ￿rst wave from 1993. Our data starts
with the second wave in 1995.
6to 2906 individuals (86:7 percent of the sample) who identify as non-Hispanic white, the
sample includes 324 individuals (9:7 percent of the sample) who identify as non-Hispanic
black and 123 individuals (3:7 percent of the sample) who identify as Hispanic. Although
the original sample includes individuals with other racial/ethnic identities, none of these
individuals remained in the sample after applying the selection criteria. With respect to
education, 33:2 percent of respondents have a high school diploma but not a college degree,
and 31:0 percent report having a college or graduate degree.
Variable  Mean Std Dev Min Max
Characteristics of Elderly Respondents (N=3353)
Female 0.65 0.48 0 1
Black 0.10 0.30 0 1
Hispanic 0.04 0.19 0 1
Age 77.96 6.03 49 103
Married 0.55 0.50 0 1
High School Diploma 0.33 0.47 0 1
College Degree 0.31 0.46 0 1
# ADL Problems 0.54 1.25 0 6
# IADL Problems 0.43 1.06 0 5
Characteristics of Adult Children and Children-in-Law (N=7807)
Female 0.51 0.50 0 1
Age 48.86 8.42 14 89
Married 0.85 0.36 0 1
Number of Children 2.18 1.57 0 13
Years of Education 13.94 2.36 0 18
Weekly Hours of Work 29.77 16.33 0 40
Resides within 10 Miles of Parent 0.36 0.48 0 1
Resides with Parent 0.03 0.18 0 1
 Market Conditions (N=2439)
Home Health Care Per Week ($100) 8.72 0.73 6.99 10.81
Ln (Nursing Home Beds Per Individual Above 70 Years) -2.85 0.38 -3.64 -2.27
Average ADL Score 5.81 0.31 5.20 6.70
Nursing Home Staff Hours Per Resident Per Day 3.06 0.23 2.40 3.60
Medicaid Policies Facing Households in Our Sample in 1993
Medically Needy Program (N = 2439) 0.96 0.20 0 1
Income Limit Facing Individuals (N = 1525) 446 79 238 724
Income Limit Facing Couples (N = 914) 673 160 311 1110
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
The elderly households in our sample report a total of 4489 adult children and 3318
children-in-law. Since each member of this generation is a potential caregiver, our mod-
els include demographic characteristics of the adult children and children-in-law. These
characteristics re￿ ect a potential caregiver￿ s opportunity costs of time, e⁄ectiveness in the
caregiving role, and/or caregiving burden. Speci￿cally, the models control for the adult
7child￿ s or child-in-law￿ s years of schooling, work status, marital status, family size (number
of children), age, and gender. As discussed extensively in Goeree, Hiedemann, and Stern
(2010), the role of child gender in elder care provision may vary by race and ethnicity; thus,
one of our models also interacts child gender with race and ethnicity. Finally, co-residence
with or proximity to an elderly parent or parent-in-law may facilitate care provision. As
discussed in Rainer and Seidler (2009), location may be endogenous. However, Stern (1995)
shows that, even after controlling for endogeneity, geographical distance explains variation
in informal care arrangements. Accordingly our models include measures of distance and
co-residence, and we conduct likelihood ratio tests to infer whether location is endogenous.
As shown in the second panel of Table 1, the younger generation displays near gender
balance: 51:1 percent are daughters or daughters-in-law. The average child or child-in-law is
almost 49 years old with nearly 14 years of schooling. These individuals report 29:8 hours of
labor market work per week, but this ￿gure understates mean labor market activity because
weekly work hours are truncated at 40:0. On average, the adult children and children-in-
law of the elderly respondents have 2:2 children, but it is worth noting that some of these
children belong to both a child and a child-in-law. A small proportion (3:3 percent) of the
adult children and children-in-law reside with the elderly respondents, and 35:5 percent lives
within 10 miles of the elderly respondents.
In addition to demographic characteristics and activity limitations, market conditions
and public policies may in￿ uence families￿care arrangements for elderly individuals. Our
models control for several dimensions of the market for formal care in the elderly individual￿ s
or couple￿ s state of residence: the average weekly cost of full-time home health care (16
hours a day for seven days or 112 hours per week), nursing home sta⁄ hours per nursing
home resident per day in facilities with Medicare or Medicaid beds, nursing home beds per
individual above 70 years, and a measure of the overall level of disability among nursing home
residents. As discussed in Harrington, Carrillo and LaCava (2006), this disability measure
(Average ADL Score) is a composite score that re￿ ects nursing home residents￿needs for
assistance with three ADLs, namely eating, toileting, and transferring. Each nursing home
resident was assigned a score from one to three for each of these ADLs, increasing in the
amount of assistance needed. A summary score ranging from three to nine was compiled for
8each facility; facility scores were then summarized for each state.5
The market for formal home health care and institutional care varies by state. The sta-
tistics presented in the third panel describe the market conditions facing elderly households
in our sample during the ￿rst year of data. On average, these households reside in states
where the mean weekly cost of full-time home health care is $872. Ranging from $699 to
$1081, these are real costs, de￿ ated with state-speci￿c price de￿ ators (Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 1999). The elderly households in our sample live in states with 2:4 to 3:6 nursing
home sta⁄hours per nursing home resident per day and 2:6 (100￿exp(￿3:637)) to 10:3 beds
per 100 individuals over 70 years. On average, these households reside in states where the
facility score ranges from 5:2 to 6:7; with a mean of 5:8 and a standard deviation of 0:31:
Many households rely on public assistance, most notably Medicaid, to cover their long-
term care expenses. Eligibility for Medicaid is linked to actual or potential receipt of cash
assistance under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program or the former Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program. Elderly individuals or couples are eligible for
SSI payments if their monthly countable income (income less $20) and countable resources
fall below a certain threshold. Income limits for Medicaid eligibility vary widely by state;
given the lack of state-level data for some years and the high correlation of a state￿ s income
limits across time, our models include only 1993 income limits.6 In most states, individuals
or couples whose incomes exceed the limits for Medicaid eligibility qualify for assistance if
their medical expenses are high relative to their incomes. In the presence of a medically
needy program, households may deduct medical expenses from income when determining
eligibility for Medicaid coverage of nursing home care or formal home health care. Thus, our
models also control for the presence of a medically needy program.
The bottom panel of Table 1 presents the 1993 average Medicaid income limits facing
elderly individuals in our sample as well as the proportion of sampled households residing
in states with a medically needy program. Individuals face monthly income limits ranging
from $238 to $724 with a mean of $446; couples face monthly income limits ranging from
5 Wages for home health aide workers were obtained from PHI (2007). The nursing home data were
obtained from Grabowski et al. (2004) and Harrington, Carrillo and LaCava (2006).
6 See http://www.people.virginia.edu/~sns5r/resint/ltcstf/medicaideligibility.pdf
9$311 to $1110 with a mean of $673. Over 95 percent of the households in our sample reside
in states that had a medically needy program in 1993.
As discussed in more detail later, we present three dynamic models of families￿long-term
care decisions. In particular, we model the family￿ s decision whether to use each potential
care arrangement (section 3.1), the family￿ s selection of the primary care arrangement (sec-
tion 3.3), and hours spent in each care arrangement (section 3.5). Our models distinguish
among several modes of care ￿institutional care, formal home health care, informal care
provided by a spouse, and informal care provided by a child or child-in-law ￿while allowing
for the possibility that an elderly individual does not receive any of these modes of care.
Informal Care Informal Care By Child Formal Home Institutional
Mode of Care By Spouse or Child-in-Law Health Care Care
Any of this Mode (All Respondents) 6.7% 3.2% 1.3% 0.1%
Primary Arrangement (All Respondents) 6.7% 1.5% 0.7% 0.1%
Primary Arrangement (Care Recipients Only) 74.7% 16.6% 8.0% 1.0%
Mean Weekly Hours (Recipients of this Mode of Care) 56 7 13 93
Table 2: Frequency of Care Mode
Ninety-one percent of the elderly individuals in our sample receive no care during the
￿rst year. Among those relying on at least one mode of care, informal care arrangements
are more common than formal care arrangements. More speci￿cally, as shown in Table 2,
6:7 percent of respondents receive care from a spouse, and 3:2 percent receive care from an
adult child or child-in-law. While 1:3 percent of respondents rely on formal home health
care, only 0:1 percent receives nursing home care. Similarly, informal care arrangements are
more common than formal arrangements as the primary mode of care.
Not surprisingly, institutionalized elderly individuals receive more care than do elderly
care recipients who remain in the community. As shown in Table 2, the average nursing home
resident receives 93 hours of care per week in the ￿rst year of data. Also, spousal caregivers
tend to provide substantially more care than do formal home health care providers or adult
children. On average, during the ￿rst year of data, spousal caregivers provide 56 hours of
care per week. In contrast, the average amount of formal home health care is 13 hours per
week among those who rely on this mode of care. The comparable ￿gure for care provided
by adult children or children-in-law is seven hours per week.
10As discussed earlier, we observe each elderly individual in our sample for at least two
and at most ￿ve di⁄erent time periods. Corresponding to 73816 possible transitions into and
out of each potential care arrangement, Table 3 shows the number of observed transitions.
We observe 401 transitions into spousal care (a transition rate of over ten percent) and 254
transitions out of spousal care (a transition rate of over 46 percent). Transition rates into
non-spousal care arrangements range from just over one percent (child or child-in-law) to
just under one percent (institutional care). We observe a transition rate out of care by a
particular child or child-in-law care of almost 43 percent, a rate of over 67 percent out of
formal home care, and a rate of 26 percent out of institutional care.
Across Two Consecutive Waves Care Arrangements
Used Neither Period Used Both Periods Not Used/Used Used/Not Used
3451 289 401 254
26628 197 362 146
9025 33 101 68
9120 20 80 7
Notes: These figures condition on the availability of the potential care arrangement in the first period of
the transition in question. Spouses and children are considered available as long as they are alive.
Formal Home Health Care





Table 3: Intertemporal Patterns of Care
3 Dynamic Models of Long-Term Care Arrangements
We model three related dimensions of families￿care arrangements for an elderly individual
in a particular time period: the use of each potential care arrangement, the selection of the
primary care arrangement, and hours spent in each care arrangement. Our models distin-
guish among several modes of care: institutional care, formal home health care, informal
care provided by the spouse, and informal care provided by an adult child or child-in-law.
Our models also allow for the possibility that the elderly individual receives no formal or
informal care in a particular period. In each model, the family makes decisions taking into
account characteristics of the potential care arrangements. In contrast to our previous work
(e.g., HS; ES; BGHS), we abstract from the possibility that family members have di⁄erent
preferences concerning care and from details about how the family makes decisions.
Care arrangements may persist as a result of the family￿ s preferences or constraints or
as a result of inertia. For example, a family￿ s aversion to institutional care may lead to
11persistence in care arrangements. Di⁄erences across family members with respect to their
caregiving e⁄ectiveness or their opportunity costs of time may also contribute to persistence
in care arrangements. Accordingly, our models control for observable factors as well as several
types of unobserved heterogeneity that may lead to persistence in care arrangements (i.e.,
spurious state dependence). Moreover, the costs of transitioning from one care arrangement
to another may enhance the value of the current arrangement. The lifestyle changes required
to enable an adult child to provide care or an elderly individual￿ s attachment to a formal
home health aide may lead to inertia in care arrangements. Similarly, moving to a nursing
home requires substantial lifestyle changes as well as disinvestments that may be di¢ cult to
reverse such as selling a home. To capture the possibility of inertia, our models allow for
positive true state dependence.
Alternatively, care arrangements may evolve over time as conditions change or as a
caregiver experiences burnout. For example, an elderly individual￿ s care arrangements may
evolve as her health or that of her spouse deteriorates, her spouse dies, or formal care becomes
more expensive. Accordingly, our models control for relevant time-varying characteristics
that may a⁄ect families￿caregiving decisions. Our models also allow the set of potential
care arrangements to vary over time in response to changes in family structure. In addition,
adult children may rotate the role of primary caregiver as a way to share the burden or
as the caregiver experiences burnout. To capture the possibility of caregiver burnout, our
models allow for negative true state dependence.
We develop and estimate three dynamic models of care. Two of these are discrete choice
models, while the third is a continuous choice model. In the Multiple Caregiver Model, the
family decides whether to use each potential care arrangement (institutional care, formal
home health care, care provided by the spouse, and care provided by each particular child).
This model allows for the possibility that the elderly individual relies on more than one
caregiver or caregiving arrangement. In the Primary Caregiver Model, the family selects
the primary care arrangement from all available alternatives. Finally, in the Hours of Care
Model, the family determines hours in each potential care arrangement. Like the Multiple
Caregiver Model, this model allows for multiple care arrangements.
In all of our models, we assume that each family has an underlying latent value for each
12potential care arrangement. More formally, consider family n that consists of one or two
elderly individuals, Jn adult children, and up to Jn children-in-law. Elderly individual i may
require care at time t. If she is married, her spouse may provide some or all of her care. In
addition, each adult child or adult child-in-law is a potential caregiver. Depending on the
model, the family decides whether to rely on each potential care arrangement, selects the
primary care arrangement, or determines how much of each arrangement to use. De￿ne the
Jn + 4 caregiving alternatives as: no care, care provided by a spouse, formal home health
care, care in a nursing home, and informal care from each of the Jn children or their spouses.
The latent value of care alternative j to individual i in family n at time t is denoted by:
y
￿
nijt = Xnit￿j + Znjt￿ + ￿jynijt￿1 + !nijt: (1)
The vector Xnit includes exogenous characteristics of the elderly individual.7 In partic-
ular, Xnit includes demographic characteristics and activity limitations that may in￿ uence
an elderly individual￿ s caregiving needs, opportunities, and preferences. The vector Znjt
includes exogenous characteristics of the potential care arrangements, namely demographics
of the adult children and children-in-law and market conditions/public policies in the elderly
individual￿ s or household￿ s state of residence.
The observed variable corresponding to the latent variable is given by ynijt: As discussed
in the following subsections, the exact de￿nition of the corresponding observed variable varies
with the model speci￿cation. The inclusion of ynijt￿1 allows past choices to in￿ uence the
current value of alternative j and, thus, captures the true dynamic component of long-term
care decision-making. To distinguish between true state dependence (as captured by the ￿j)
and persistence in care arrangements due to unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., spurious state
dependence), we allow for unobserved correlation across time (as captured by !nijt). We
refer to ￿j as true state dependence, which is alternative-speci￿c in two of our models.
We decompose the random components of families￿long-term care decisions, !nijt, into
(at least) two types of unobserved heterogeneity as well as an idiosyncratic error term, "nijt :
!nijt = uni + ￿nij + "nijt:
7 We augment the continuous choice model to allow for substitution across types of care.
13Some elderly individuals may have preferences for certain care options that are not observed
to the econometrician and hence not captured by X or Z. For example, a family may
avoid institutional care due to a particularly strong philosophical or cultural reason. Such
individual/family-alternative-speci￿c correlation across time is captured by ￿nij: In addition,
there may be individual- or family-speci￿c characteristics that in￿ uence all care alternatives
across time but are unobserved to the econometrician. For example, high levels of wealth
may enable a family to purchase formal care rather than to rely exclusively or primarily on
family members. Such individual/family-speci￿c correlation across time and alternatives is
captured by uni: As shown in the following subsections, the assumed distributions of uni;
￿nij; and "nijt vary across our three models to allow for experimentation with di⁄erent error
structures. For ease of exposition, we drop the family subscript in the following subsections.
3.1 Multiple Caregiver Model
In our Multiple Caregiver Model, the family decides whether to use each potential care
arrangement by taking into account characteristics of the elderly individual, characteristics
of the care arrangement, and whether the individual relied on that arrangement in the
previous period. Excluding the dynamic component, this approach is similar to that of CS,
Brown (2006), and BGHS. In this model, we assume that the family selects each arrangement
with a positive latent value without considering interactions across care alternatives.
More technically, we estimate a dynamic multivariate probit model, where the baseline
latent value of alternative j is given in equation (1). We assume "ijt ￿ iidN (0;1); ui ￿
iidN (0;￿2





and de￿ne Fu;￿ (￿) as the joint distribution of u and ￿:












m) = Xit￿j + Zijt￿ + ￿jyijt￿1 + ui + ￿ij;
where yijt￿1 equals one if alternative j was chosen last period, ￿
m = (￿;￿;￿;￿￿;￿u) is the
vector of parameters to estimate, and the m superscript denotes Multiple Caregiver Model.
















3.2 Multiple Caregiver Results
Table 4 presents the multivariate probit results. Several demographic characteristics signif-
icantly in￿ uence the value of each potential care arrangement.8 For example, controlling
for marital status, age, activity limitations, educational attainment, and several character-
istics of the spouse, white families value each mode of care more highly for men than for
women. Most of these gender gaps are more pronounced among black and Hispanic elderly
individuals. Although inconsistent with some of the ￿ndings in the literature (e.g., McGarry,
1998; Pezzin and Schone, 1999b; CS), the implication that families value informal care more
highly for elderly men than for elderly women is consistent with the implications of the
game-theoretic analysis in BGHS; speci￿cally, BGHS suggest that care provided to mothers
is less e⁄ective (albeit also less burdensome) than care provided to fathers.
Activity limitations and age signi￿cantly in￿ uence the value of care arrangements. The
value of each mode of care depends positively on the number of ADL and IADL problems
experienced by an elderly individual. Controlling for activity limitations, informal care is
less valuable as the individual ages.
Consistent with the literature (e.g., Stern 1995), our results imply that spouses are an
important source of care for one another. At ￿rst glance, the large, negative parameter esti-
mates associated with marital status for the other care arrangements appear to suggest that
families value non-spousal care arrangements signi￿cantly more highly for unmarried than
for married elders. However, parameter estimates associated with the spouse￿ s characteris-
tics mitigate or dominate the direct e⁄ect of marital status, so that the average marginal
e⁄ect of having a spouse on the other care choices is positive. For example, as the spouse
8 In this section, our discussion focuses on the relationship between each characteristic and the
latent value of using a particular mode of care relative to the outcome where the individual does
not use that mode of care. In a separate section, we present and discuss the marginal e⁄ects as-
sociated with the most policy-relevant variables. For a complete set of marginal e⁄ects, please see
www.people.virginia.edu/~sns5r/resint/ltcstf/dynamicmarginale⁄ects.html
15ages, all forms of care increase in value. The spouse￿ s IADL problems reduce the value of
spousal care while enhancing the value of care provided by a child or a home health aide.9
Variable Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err
True State Dependence Effect 0.795 ** 0.078 1.426 ** 0.097 1.070 ** 0.188 2.158 ** 0.424
Parent and Spouse Characteristics
Constant -3.815 ** 0.182 -1.565 ** 0.282 -2.066 ** 0.910 -6.307 ** 2.051
Female -0.308 ** 0.079 -0.758 ** 0.068 -0.566 ** 0.144 -0.762 ** 0.170
Black 0.176 0.213 0.123 0.299 -0.168 0.371 0.335 0.383
Hispanic 0.510 0.346 -0.164 0.551 0.069 0.332 -0.381 0.712
Female*Black -0.619 ** 0.277 -0.619 ** 0.314 0.112 0.541 -0.762 0.529
Female*Hispanic -1.529 ** 0.543 -0.296 0.687 -4.117 1372.4
Married -4.436 ** 0.258 -2.548 ** 0.898 -5.630 ** 0.958
Age -0.013 ** 0.006 -0.015 ** 0.003 -0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.006
Spouse Age 0.044 ** 0.006 0.051 ** 0.003 0.036 ** 0.008 0.075 ** 0.009
HS Diploma -0.059 0.101 0.152 ** 0.076 0.210 0.166 0.078 0.221
College Degree -0.090 0.107 0.027 0.088 0.139 0.179 0.205 0.205
Spouse HS Diploma 0.141 0.101 -0.194 * 0.103 0.082 0.216 0.210 0.317
Spouse College Degree -0.123 0.107 -0.216 * 0.134 0.095 0.236 -0.288 0.335
# ADLs 0.059 ** 0.025 0.057 ** 0.016 0.144 ** 0.034 0.199 ** 0.051
# IADLs 0.442 ** 0.028 0.295 ** 0.021 0.208 ** 0.048 0.255 ** 0.053
# Spouse ADLs 0.033 0.029 0.035 0.037 0.092 * 0.056 0.110 0.085
# Spouse IADLS -0.100 ** 0.029 0.170 ** 0.046 0.132 ** 0.058 0.137 0.096
Child Characteristics





# Kids -0.014 0.023
Working -0.002 0.002
Married -0.069 0.079
Child Lives Within 10 Miles 0.395 ** 0.067
Child Lives With Parent 0.910 ** 0.102
Local Characteristics
Home Health Care Per Week ($100) -2.075 ** 0.655
Medically Needy Program 0.174 0.398 0.081 0.353
SSI Income Limit 1 Person ($1000) 1.764 * 1.131 1.263 1.033
SSI Income Limit 2 Person ($1000) 0.801 * 0.505 -0.462 0.679
Ln(NH Beds Per Population > 70) 0.018 0.189
ADL Score -0.173 0.342
Nursing Hours 1.044 ** 0.299
Standard Deviation Person-Alternative Error (Restricted) 0.001
Standard Deviation Person Error 0.618 ** 0.037
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Care
Informal Care Formal Home Institutional Informal Care
by Spouse by Child Health Care
Table 4: Multiple Caregiver: Multivariate Probit Estimates
Our results also shed light on the role of adult children￿ s characteristics in families￿long-
term care arrangements for elderly individuals. Consistent with the literature (e.g., SPH;
Wolf, Freedman and Soldo, 1997; CS; ES), child gender is associated with informal care
9 One cannot include a variable for marital status in the spousal care value because a spouse can provide
care only if she exists; thus the MLE of such a parameter would be in￿nity.
16provision. In white families, daughters are valued more highly than sons as caregivers, after
controlling for other demographic characteristics. The e⁄ects of child gender in Black and
Hispanic families are smaller and not statistically signi￿cant. Children who live with or near
their elderly parents are valued more highly as caregivers.10
Several market conditions and public policies in the elderly individual￿ s state of residence
also signi￿cantly in￿ uence care arrangements. After controlling for activity limitations, the
attractiveness of formal home health care depends negatively on the average wages of home
health care providers and positively on the generosity of a state￿ s income limits for Medicaid
coverage of formal modes of care. Institutional care is a more attractive option in states
with greater nursing home sta⁄ hours per nursing home resident.
The results of this model highlight the importance of controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity over time, as the estimate of the standard deviation of the person error (￿￿) is
large and signi￿cant. Unobserved characteristics such as wealth and chronic health condi-
tions unrelated to ADL and IADL problems may contribute to spurious state dependence
in care arrangements. Moreover, the results indicate that there is signi￿cant positive true
state dependence ￿or inertia ￿across all caregiving choices. This ￿nding probably re￿ ects
the substantial economic and psychological costs associated with transitions from one care
arrangement to another. To the extent that caregiver burnout contributes to negative true
state dependence, its e⁄ect is dominated by inertia.
We also estimated a static multivariate probit model where care arrangements in the
previous period do not in￿ uence current care arrangements (i.e., we restrict ￿j = 0). Most
of the parameter estimates associated with the static model are consistent in sign with
those of the dynamic model, but their magnitudes tend to be larger and more statistically
signi￿cant. For example, the relationship between the generosity of a state￿ s Medicaid policy
and the value of formal home health care is larger and more statistically signi￿cant in the
static model. Perhaps some characteristics matter more in the initial choice of the care
arrangement than in the current decision conditional on past decisions. Also, in the model
10 Later in the paper, we address the potential endogeneity of geographic distance. In particular, we test
whether the role of the child￿ s initial (exogenous) location relative to the parent di⁄ers from the role of the
child￿ s current (potentially endogenous) location relative to the parent.
17with dynamics, the measured e⁄ects may be associated with ￿ ows, while, in the static
model, the measured e⁄ects may be associated with a stock of present and future ￿ ows (e.g.,
Berkovec and Stern, 1991).
Evidence of inertia in care arrangements and the sensitivity of parameter estimates across
our static and dynamic models underscore the importance of developing models that capture
intertemporal patterns of care. As discussed earlier, most of the models in this literature
are static (e.g., SPH; PSa; ES; PPS; BGHS). While a few studies present dynamic models
(GM; BKM; DL; HM; Gardner and Gilleskie, 2009), our models encompass a broader range
of care arrangements.
3.3 Primary Caregiver Model
Much of the long-term care literature focuses on the selection of the primary care arrange-
ment for an elderly individual (e.g., HS; ES), but all of the existing models of the primary
care arrangement are static in nature. In our Primary Caregiver Model, the family selects
the primary care arrangement for an elderly individual in a particular time period taking
into account the characteristics of the potential care recipient, the characteristics of the po-
tential care arrangements, and the primary care arrangement selected the previous period.
The primary care arrangement is the arrangement with the highest latent value. If the
value of each potential care arrangement is less than the value of remaining independent,
the individual receives no care.
More technically, we estimate a multinomial mixed logit model (McFadden and Train,
2000) where the baseline latent value to alternative j is given in equation (1) with one mod-
i￿cation. In particular, in Table 4, we see that the estimate of the standard deviation of the
individual/alternative-speci￿c unobserved heterogeneity e⁄ect is very small. Since our priors
are that there is some important source of individual/alternative-speci￿c unobserved hetero-
geneity, we try modelling it in a di⁄erent way. We augment the baseline latent value given in
equation (1) to incorporate individual/time-speci￿c unobserved heterogeneity, denoted vit:
Speci￿cally, unobserved components are now given by
!ijt = ￿jui + ￿jvit + ￿ij + "ijt; (2)
18where we assume u ￿ iidN(0;￿u); vt ￿ iidN (0;￿v); ￿j ￿ iidN (0;￿￿); and "ijt ￿ iidEV:
The ￿j and ￿j terms are alternative-speci￿c factor loadings. The variance terms of ￿u and
￿v are restricted to one for identi￿cation, and the o⁄-diagonal terms are estimated. The o⁄-
diagonal terms are transformed to 2e#u
1+e#u ￿1 to insure that ￿1 ￿ ￿u21 ￿ 1; which is necessary
for positive-de￿niteness.11 The variance and correlation terms of ￿￿ are estimated using
transformations, ￿￿ii = expf￿￿ig for the variance terms (to insure positive terms) and the
correlation in the same way as for ￿u21:
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p) = Xit￿j + Zijt￿ + ￿yijt￿1 + ￿jui + ￿jvit + ￿ij; (3)
with parameters given by ￿
p = (￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿u;￿v;￿￿) (the p superscript denotes Primary
Caregiver Model). The lagged care decision, yijt￿1; is a dummy variable equal to one if care
arrangement j was the primary arrangement in the previous period. Let ait be a dummy
variable indicating whether individual i is living at time t: Then the likelihood contribution
for family n is
Ln =

















where Fu;￿;v(￿) is the joint distribution of the unobservables. There is no closed form solution
to equation (4), so we estimate the model using maximum simulated likelihood estimation.







































are errors simulated from their respective densities (BKM; Hajivassiliou,
McFadden, and Ruud, 1996).12
11 The variance terms of ￿u are restricted to be one because ui is multiplied by an alternative-speci￿c
factor loading (￿j); so the variance terms are not identi￿ed.
12 We use antithetic acceleration in simulation. Geweke (1988) shows that if antithetic acceleration is
193.4 Primary Caregiver Results
Table 5 presents multinomial mixed logit parameter estimates for the choice of the primary
care arrangement. Consistent with the Multiple Caregiver Model, the results of the Primary
Caregiver Model provide evidence that inertia plays a role in elder care arrangements. That
is, we ￿nd statistically signi￿cant, positive state dependence in the choice of the primary care
arrangement after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. While caregiver
burnout could motivate family members ￿particularly siblings ￿to alternate the role of
primary caregiver, the sign and statistical signi￿cance of the relevant parameter estimate
suggests that the impact of burnout is dominated by inertia.
The roles of demographic characteristics and activity limitations in the decision to use a
particular mode of care are generally similar to their roles in the selection of the primary care
arrangement.13 For example, as an elderly individual develops more activity limitations,
the value of each potential mode of care signi￿cantly increases as an arrangement (in Table
4) and as the primary care arrangement (in Table 5). Similarly, marriage, by itself, signi￿-
cantly reduces the value of non-spousal care arrangements, both overall and as the primary
arrangement. However, as in the Multiple Caregiver Model, as the elderly individual￿ s spouse
ages, the attractiveness of alternative care arrangements increases signi￿cantly, neutralizing
the direct e⁄ect of marriage, while the attractiveness of spousal care as an arrangement and
as the primary arrangement falls signi￿cantly.
Although the Primary Caregiver Model explicitly controls only for health limitations
that relate to ADLs and IADLs, the person-time-choice factor loadings (￿j) may capture
the role of temporary health conditions unrelated to ADL or IADL limitations. Estimates for
these factor loadings indicate that person-time-speci￿c heterogeneity signi￿cantly in￿ uences
the values of the two informal care arrangements. Thus, the results of this model suggest
that temporary health conditions unrelated to ADL and IADL limitations may change the
relative attractiveness of each informal care mode and hence may induce a change in the
implemented during simulation, then the loss in precision is of order 1=N (where N is the number of
observations), which requires no adjustment to the asymptotic covariance matrix.
13 Again our discussion focuses on the relationship between each characteristic and the latent value of
using a particular mode of care relative to the outcome where the individual does not use that mode of care.
Later we present and discuss selected marginal e⁄ects.
20individual￿ s primary care arrangement.
Variable Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err
True State Dependence Effect 1.129 ** 0.066
Parent and Spouse Characteristics
Constant -2.330 ** 0.366 -4.325 ** 0.930 -5.279 ** 2.622 -15.769 ** 5.019
Female -1.291 ** 0.183 -3.355 ** 0.283 -2.726 ** 0.394 -4.108 ** 0.566
Black -0.321 0.274 -1.391 ** 0.361 -0.357 0.695 -0.274 0.666
Hispanic 0.142 0.521 -0.125 0.422 -0.458 1.062
Married -6.899 ** 1.344 -8.150 ** 3.420 -8.632 ** 3.112
Age 0.048 ** 0.016 -0.012 0.010 0.026 0.017 0.030 0.020
Spouse Age -0.036 ** 0.016 0.075 ** 0.016 0.110 ** 0.032 0.127 ** 0.033
HS Diploma -0.042 0.187 0.318 0.241 0.761 * 0.449 0.384 0.525
College Degree -0.253 0.199 0.129 0.259 0.609 0.462 0.563 0.477
Spouse HS Diploma 0.085 0.190 -0.888 ** 0.367 0.140 0.819 0.162 0.772
Spouse College Degree -0.155 0.202 -0.645 * 0.406 -0.029 0.770 -0.888 0.882
# ADLs 0.084 * 0.046 0.097 * 0.055 0.201 ** 0.081 0.477 ** 0.119
# IADLs 0.763 ** 0.057 0.802 ** 0.068 0.674 ** 0.117 0.912 ** 0.131
# Spouse ADLs 0.133 ** 0.062 0.127 0.110 0.315 * 0.170 0.206 0.199
# Spouse IADLS -0.128 ** 0.065 0.515 ** 0.131 0.215 0.187 0.475 ** 0.219
Person-Time-Choice Factor Loading -0.426 ** 0.107 0.199 * 0.125 0.056 0.299 -0.081 0.272
Person-Choice Factor Loading 0.256 ** 0.106 1.026 ** 0.141 0.770 ** 0.244 1.514 ** 0.261
Child Characteristics
Female 0.659 ** 0.134
Age 0.009 0.012
Education 0.067 * 0.040
# Kids -0.036 0.048
Working -0.004 0.004
Married -0.701 ** 0.190
Child Lives Within 10 Miles 0.816 ** 0.177
Child Lives With Parent 2.257 ** 0.236
Local Characteristics
Home Health Care Per Week ($100) -4.478 ** 1.788
Medically Needy Program 0.430 1.030 0.123 0.807
SSI Income Limit 1 Person ($1000) 4.535 * 2.552 3.749 * 2.323
SSI Income Limit 2 Person ($1000) 1.131 1.625 -0.636 1.530
Ln(NH Beds Per Population > 70) -0.118 0.376
ADL Score -0.665 0.771
Nursing Hours 2.549 ** 0.668
Person-Time Effect Father-Mother -1.000
Person Effect Father-Mother -1.000
Cholesky Term Father 0.327 ** 0.106
Cholesky Term Mother 0.146 0.121
Cholesky Term Father-Mother -0.821 ** 0.098
Notes: The parameter estimate in the Cholesky decomposition for the Person-Time Effect was diverging to negative infinity so we restricted it









Table 5: Primary Caregiver: Multinomial Mixed Logit Estimates
In the absence of information concerning income and wealth, education may serve as
a proxy for ￿nancial well-being. As in the Multiple Caregiver Model, the results suggest
21a limited in￿ uence of education on the value of potential care arrangements. However, the
person-choice factor loading (￿j) estimates indicate that person-speci￿c unobservables ￿such
as wealth ￿which in￿ uence all care alternatives across time, are signi￿cantly related to the
value of each potential mode of care as the primary care arrangement.
The implications concerning the characteristics of the younger generation are similar
across the discrete choice models. Again families value daughters more than sons as care-
givers, and proximity to or co-residence with elderly parents enhances the value of care
provided by an adult child. Although a child￿ s marital status is not signi￿cantly related to
her value as a caregiver, marriage signi￿cantly reduces her value as the primary caregiver.
Again several market conditions and public policies signi￿cantly in￿ uence the value of
formal care arrangements in both discrete choice models. For example, the value of formal
home health care as an arrangement or as the primary arrangement depends negatively on
the cost of home health aide workers. Similarly, the value of institutional care depends
positively on the nursing home sta⁄hours per resident in the individual￿ s state of residence.
3.5 Hours of Care Model
An important dimension of caregiving decisions concerns how much care to provide. Follow-
ing SPH, Wolf, Freedman, and Soldo (1997), Pezzin and Schone (1999b), CS, and BGHS,
we next consider the continuous choice associated with caregiving alternatives. As discussed
earlier, families may rely on more than one mode of care. For example, an elderly individual
may receive informal care provided by a child together with formal care provided by a home
health aide. As this example suggests, various caregiving alternatives ￿and the amount
provided ￿may be substitutable to some extent. Moreover, the quantity of care received
in the past could impact the value associated with the quantity of that care alternative
provided today. Accordingly, our Hours of Care Model allows for the possibility of multiple
care arrangements, while linking arrangements over time.
We estimate a dynamic multivariate tobit model, where we augment the baseline latent
value of care in equation (1) to allow for substitution across modes of care as well as di⁄erent
e⁄ects of true state dependence. Speci￿cally, the latent value associated with the amount of
time spent using the jth care arrangement is given by
22y
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j 1(yijt￿1 > 0) + ￿
marg
j yijt￿1 + !ijt; (5)
where the observed continuous value of caregiving is given by yijt = max(0;y￿
ijt): As in CS,
substitution in total care provided across alternatives is captured by ￿j
P
j06=j
yij0: The ￿j terms
capture true state dependence in caregiving where the amount of care provided of mode j
depends both on whether j was chosen in the previous period (captured by the threshold
value of true state dependence, ￿thresh) as well as the quantity of alternative j provided in
the previous period (captured by the marginal value of true state dependence, ￿marg).14
Similar to the Primary Caregiver Model, this model decomposes the random components
of families￿long-term care decisions into three types of unobserved heterogeneity as well as
an idiosyncratic error term:
!ijt = ui + ￿ij + vit + "ijt;
where ui ￿ iidN (0;￿2
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v), and "ijt ￿ iidN (0;￿2
"): The
parameters to estimate are ￿" and ￿
h = (￿;￿;￿;￿;￿u;￿￿;￿v) (the h superscript denotes
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The set of values An of the idiosyncratic error " that results in the amount of time spent
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if yijt = 0
)
:
14 Equation (5) is a set of structural equations, one for each alternative available to the family. If we
ignore the nonnegativity constraints on yij, we can solve equation (5) to get a reduced form set of equations.
CS show how to add the nonnegativity constraints in an algorithm that handles nonlinearity of the reduced
form. They state that the nonnegativity constraints lead to the potential for multiple equilibria. The most
common cause of multiple equilibria is the inclusion of a discrete dependent variable. For example, if we
were to include a term such as
P
j06=j 1(yij0t > 0) or 1
￿P
j06=j yij0t > 0
￿
on the right-hand side of equation
(5), then we would have a generalization of the problem discussed in the entry literature (Bresnahan and
Reiss, 1991; Tamer, 2003; and Goeree and Stern, 2010). Fontaine, Gramain, and Wittwer (2009) estimate
a model of family long-term care decisions with only binary interactions using an estimation technology
from Tamer (2003). In this work, we focus on the structural equations directly; we do not address issues of
multiple equilibria but treat the observed outcome as the only equilibrium.































where Fu;￿;v(￿) denotes the joint distribution of the unobservables. We simulate equation (6)
using GHK. Estimating the asymptotic covariance matrix is standard (Geweke, 1991).
3.6 Hours of Care Results
Table 6 presents the results of our dynamic multivariate tobit model. The results of this
Hours of Care Model reinforce the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
over time, as the estimate of the standard deviation of the person error (￿￿) is relatively
large and statistically signi￿cant. All modes of care exhibit statistically signi￿cant true
state dependence. The quantity of each mode of informal care in the current period depends
positively on the use of that mode of care in the previous period ￿a threshold inertia e⁄ect
￿and on the quantity provided in the previous period ￿a marginal inertia e⁄ect. The
quantity of formal home health care in the current period exhibits threshold inertia, while
the quantity of institutional care exhibits marginal inertia. Thus, the results again indicate
that, to the extent that caregiver burden in￿ uences long-term care arrangements, its impact
is dominated by inertia.
Contrary to our expectations and to the literature (e.g., CS and Van Houtven and Norton,
2004), the estimated substitution e⁄ects indicate that the quantity of each mode of care
depends positively on the total amount of care currently received from other sources. The
positive e⁄ects associated with informal care provided by a child may capture competition
among children for a bequest (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers, 1985). However, a bequest
motive of this sort would not explain positive e⁄ects associated with the other modes of
care. Instead these might re￿ ect parent-speci￿c unobserved heterogeneity not captured by
our model speci￿cation.
Most characteristics that signi￿cantly increase (decrease) the latent value of using a
particular mode of care also signi￿cantly increase (decrease) hours spent in that mode. For
example, ADL and IADL problems increase the attractiveness of formal as well as informal
24care arrangements. Likewise, hours in each arrangement depend positively on the number
of ADL and IADL problems. Consistent with expectations as well as the implications of
the discrete-choice models, adult children who live with or near their elderly parents provide
more assistance than do their geographically distant counterparts.
Variable Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err
Substitution Effect 0.167 ** 0.053 0.348 ** 0.048 0.289 ** 0.060 0.759 ** 0.062
True State Dependence Effects
Threshhold Effect 0.176 ** 0.051 0.364 ** 0.045 0.402 ** 0.084 0.334 0.243
Marginal Effect 0.214 * 0.110 0.521 ** 0.198 0.126 0.140 1.173 ** 0.345
Parent and Spouse Characteristics
Constant -1.253 ** 0.042 -0.645 ** 0.091 -1.013 ** 0.274 -2.726 ** 0.667
Female -0.134 ** 0.024 -0.273 ** 0.028 -0.225 ** 0.054 -0.297 ** 0.053
Black -0.013 0.055 -0.109 ** 0.045 -0.032 0.091 0.028 0.086
Hispanic 0.044 0.097 -0.078 0.078 0.050 0.107
Married -1.428 ** 0.045 -0.731 ** 0.225 -1.441 ** 0.157
Age -0.006 ** 0.002 -0.004 ** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Spouse Age 0.016 ** 0.002 0.016 ** 0.000 0.011 ** 0.001 0.022 ** 0.001
HS Diploma -0.025 0.033 0.053 * 0.032 0.104 * 0.065 0.016 0.089
College Degree -0.051 0.036 0.005 0.035 0.086 0.068 0.095 0.075
Spouse HS Diploma 0.037 0.033 -0.075 * 0.042 0.028 0.091 0.059 0.099
Spouse College Degree -0.050 0.037 -0.102 ** 0.051 0.037 0.094 -0.189 * 0.111
# ADLs 0.032 ** 0.008 0.013 * 0.007 0.048 ** 0.013 0.081 ** 0.016
# IADLs 0.139 ** 0.011 0.098 ** 0.009 0.088 ** 0.018 0.095 ** 0.016
# Spouse ADLs 0.007 0.010 0.002 0.015 0.033 0.022 0.025 0.024
# Spouse IADLS -0.029 ** 0.011 0.059 ** 0.019 0.038 * 0.023 0.079 ** 0.027
Child Characteristics
Female 0.086 ** 0.027
Age -0.001 0.001
Education 0.005 0.006
# Kids -0.005 0.009
Working -0.001 0.001
Married -0.022 0.033
Child Lives Within 10 Miles 0.126 ** 0.030
Child Lives With Parent 0.313 ** 0.040
Local Characteristics
Home Health Care Per Week ($100) -0.800 ** 0.255
Medically Needy Program 0.052 0.055 -0.096 0.114
SSI Income Limit 1 Person ($1000) -0.057 0.113 0.599 * 0.360
SSI Income Limit 2 Person ($1000) 0.459 ** 0.103 -0.246 0.194
Ln(NH Beds Per Population > 70) 0.055 0.129
ADL Score 0.773 ** 0.392
Nursing Hours 0.286 0.201
Std Dev for Parent Effect 0.181 ** 0.014
Std Dev for Parent-Alternative Effect (Restricted) 0.001
Std Dev for Parent-Time Effect 0.040 ** 0.018
Std Dev for Idiosyncratic Effect 0.402 ** 0.008









by Spouse by Child
Table 6: Hours of Caregiving: Multivariate Tobit Estimates
25Market conditions and public policies signi￿cantly in￿ uence the quantity of formal care
received by the elderly individual. Consistent with our other models, the quantity of formal
home health care depends negatively on the average wages of home health care providers.
The quantity of institutional care depends positively on the generosity of a state￿ s Medicaid
limits facing individuals, while the quantity of formal home health care depends positively
on the generosity of a state￿ s Medicaid limits facing couples.
4 Policy Implications
For each of our dynamic models, we present the marginal e⁄ects associated with the charac-
teristics that have the most relevance from a public policy perspective. In particular, Table
7 displays the marginal e⁄ects associated with the market conditions and public policies in
the elderly individual￿ s state of residence.
The cost of formal home health care in￿ uences the family￿ s long-term care decisions. As
indicated in the top panel of Table 7, as the weekly cost of full-time formal home health care
increases by $100, the predicted probability that the elderly individual receives this mode
of care falls by 5 percentage points. As shown in the middle panel, the cost of formal home
health care also in￿ uences the selection of the primary care arrangement. In response to
a $100 increase in the weekly cost of full-time care, the predicted probability of relying on
formal home health care as the primary arrangement falls by 3:3 percentage points, while the
predicted probability of living independently increases by 2.1 percentage points.15 Finally,
as shown in the bottom panel, conditional on receiving formal home health care, an increase
of $100 in its weekly cost is associated with a 6:2 percentage point reduction (about 10:4
hours) in the predicted quantity of formal home health care.
The existing literature provides mixed evidence concerning the e⁄ects of state-level Med-
icaid policy on nursing home utilization. Cutler and Sheiner (1994) report a positive and
statistically signi￿cant relationship between the presence of a medically needy program and
the probability of nursing home use. Similarly, ES suggest that the presence of a medically
15 The marginal e⁄ects associated with the Primary Caregiver Model sum to one. As a result of rounding
error the marginal e⁄ects associated with independent living may di⁄er from one minus the sum of the
marginal e⁄ects reported in the Table 7.
26needy program enhances the value of nursing home care. In contrast, Aykan (2002) does
not ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant relationship between the presence of a medically needy
program and the likelihood of institutional care. Likewise, Grabowski and Gruber (2007)
report that the availability of a spend-down program is not statistically signi￿cantly asso-
ciated with nursing home use. Consistent with Aykan (2002) and Grabowski and Gruber
(2007), the presence of a medically needy program is not statistically signi￿cantly associated
with the use of institutional care in our models. However, our Multiple Caregiver Model
indicates that the presence of a medically needy program is associated with a 0.4 percentage
point increase in the predicted probability of using formal home health care.
Informal Care Informal Care Formal Home Institutional
by Spouse by Child Health Care Care
Variable Effect Std Err Effect Std Err Effect Std Err Effect Std Err
Multiple Caregiver Model
Average Probability 0.162 ** 0.00 0.173 ** 0.002 0.045 ** 0.00 0.037 ** 0.00
Home Health Care Per Week ($100) -0.050 ** 0.002
Medically Needy Program 0.004 ** 0.001 0.001 0.001
SSI Income Limit 1 Person ($1000) 0.043 ** 0.004 0.021 ** 0.003
SSI Income Limit 2 Person ($1000) 0.019 ** 0.002 -0.007 ** 0.002
Ln(NH Beds Per Population > 70) 0.000 0.000
ADL Score -0.003 ** 0.001
Nursing Hours 0.016 ** 0.001
Primary Caregiver Model
Average Probability 0.078 ** 0.008 0.036 ** 0.011 0.009 ** 0.002 0.010 ** 0.002
Home Health Care Per Week ($100) 0.008 ** 0.004 0.003 ** 0.001 -0.033 ** 0.015 0.003 * 0.002
Medically Needy Program -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.005
SSI Income Limit 1 Person ($1000) -0.004 ** 0.016 0.020 0.013 0.014 0.010
SSI Income Limit 2 Person ($1000) -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.003
Ln(NH Beds Per Population > 70) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001
ADL Score 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.005
Nursing Hours -0.005 ** 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 ** 0.001 0.017 ** 0.005
Hours of Care Model
Average Conditional Probability 0.2154 ** 0.002 0.1335 ** 0.001 0.1217 ** 0.008 0.1078 ** 0.015
Home Health Care Per Week ($100) -0.062 ** 0.007
Medically Needy Program 0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.004
SSI Income Limit 1 Person ($1000) 0.034 ** 0.010 0.021 0.017
SSI Income Limit 2 Person ($1000) 0.012 ** 0.003 0.006 0.046
Ln(NH Beds Per Population > 70) 0.004 ** 0.001
ADL Score -0.003 0.003
Nursing Hours 0.030 ** 0.012
Number of Observations 3928 18298 9330 9330
Notes: The reported marginal effects are the average marginal effects across all years.  ** indicates significance at the 5%
level; * indicates significance at the 10% level.  Hours of care marginal effects are conditional on providing any care and are
measured in terms of the proportion of total time.
Table 7: Marginal E⁄ects for Market Conditions and Public Policies
27Care arrangements depend on the generosity of the state￿ s income limits for Medicaid
eligibility. In response to a $1000 increase in the annual income limit facing unmarried
individuals, the predicted probabilities that a lone elder relies on formal home health care or
institutional care respectively increase by 4:3 and 2:1 percentage points. The positive and
statistically signi￿cant relationship between income limits and nursing home use is consistent
with economic theory and Gardner and Gilleskie (2009) but inconsistent with Grabowski and
Gruber (2007). It is worth noting that Grabowski and Gruber (2007) set income limits to
zero in states with spend-down provisions, while we use the actual income limits for all
states. Among lone elders who receive formal home health care, predicted hours increase by
5:7 hours per week as the income limit increases by $1000. In general, the e⁄ects of income
limits are smaller but qualitatively similar for married individuals. However, for married
elders, the likelihood of institutional care is negatively associated with the income limit.
The use of institutional care depends on the quality and availability of care in the el-
derly individual￿ s state of residence. For example, in response to an additional sta⁄ hour
per resident, the predicted probability of relying on institutional care as the primary care
arrangement increases by 1:7 percentage points. Among nursing home residents, the pre-
dicted quantity of care increases by about 5 hours per week in response to an additional sta⁄
hour per resident and by about 40 minutes per week in response to a one percent increase
in the number of nursing home beds per elderly resident.
5 Speci￿cation and Robustness Checks
In this section, we address several limitations of our data and models. First, given the poor
quality of our income and wealth data, we explore the implications of excluding income and
wealth from our models. Second, we test whether state/arrangement-speci￿c e⁄ects and
other state-speci￿c e⁄ects not captured in our models in￿ uence care arrangements. Finally,
we examine whether the distance between an elderly parent and an adult child is endogenous.
285.1 Income and Wealth Data
As we discussed in section 2, the measures of income and assets/wealth in the AHEAD/HRS
may not be reliable. Therefore, our models do not control for income or wealth. Here we
present several alternative speci￿cations to test whether adding income or wealth would sig-
ni￿cantly improve the ￿t of our models. In light of the ￿ndings in Gardner and Gilleskie
(2009) that an important e⁄ect of wealth operates through its interactions with state Medic-
aid rules, we also examine interactions of income and wealth with policy characteristics. To
facilitate comparison with Gardner and Gilleskie (2009) and BGHS, we use 1989 and 1993
Medicaid income and asset limits as well as dummy variables indicating the presence of a
medically needy program. For each model, we estimate several additional speci￿cations. In
addition to income or wealth, these speci￿cations include income or wealth interacted with
Medicaid income or asset limits as well as the presence of a medically needy program. One
of the wealth speci￿cations excludes observations with missing information on wealth. Since
the lack of information concerning wealth may not be random, the remaining wealth speci-
￿cations include a dummy variable for missing wealth data.16 While Gardner and Gilleskie
(2009) treat the Medicaid asset limit as a discrete cuto⁄, our approach accommodates the
possibility that individuals just above the limit may spend down and thus behave similarly
to those who are just below the limit.17 In particular, we include ￿smoothed￿assets in our
third wealth speci￿cation.18 To reduce the in￿ uence of large ￿ uctuations in reported wealth,
the ￿nal speci￿cation replaces the individual￿ s current wealth with her average wealth over
the observed time frame.
16 Wealth includes all assets. We use SSI Medicaid income limits for singles or couples, depending on the
individual￿ s marital status. Although adding dummy variables is a common way to handle missing values,
Abbrevaya and Donald (2011) suggest that this approach may not always provide the desired result.
17 Norton (1995) reports evidence that welfare aversion among the elderly actually leads to the opposite
pattern as individuals seek to avoid Medicaid eligibility.
18 Let Wit be the wealth of family i at time t, and let Ci be the state-speci￿c asset limit. The smoothed




log(Wit + 1 ￿ Ci) if Wit ￿ Ci
log(Ci + 1 ￿ Wit) if Wit < Ci
:
29Individual Chi-Square Test Statistics
Joint Joint Income or Wealth Interacted with
Model Specification Chi-Square Critical Medically Medicaid Missing Critical
Test Statistic Value Constant Needy Program Limit Wealth Value
Income and Income interactions:
Multiple Caregiver
1993 Medicaid Limits 11.24* 7.81 0.38 7.39* 4.87* 3.84
1989 Medicaid Limits 2919* 7.81 0.38 0.26 0.19 3.84
Primary Caregiver
1993 Medicaid Limits 27.57* 7.81 9.03* 0.66 0.27 3.84
1989 Medicaid Limits 22019* 7.81 9.03* 3.14 1.36 3.84
Hours of Care
1993 Medicaid Limits 8.00* 7.81 0.16 5.17* 3.26 3.84
1989 Medicaid Limits 34.00* 7.81 0.16 0.00 1.42 3.84
Wealth and interactions using 1989 Medicaid Limits with:
Multiple Caregiver
Missing Wealth Observations Excluded 3874* 7.81 1.33 1.15 1.42 3.84
Missing Wealth Observations Dummy Variable 51.92* 9.49 2.09 2.40 2.89 0.40 3.84
Smoothed Limits with Missing Wealth Dummy 48.46* 9.49 2.41 0.03 0.74 0.29 3.84
Average Wealth Smoothed Limits with Missing Wealth Dummy 70.93* 9.49 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.28 3.84
Primary Caregiver
Missing Wealth Observations Excluded 3177* 7.81 4.25* 1.51 2.06 3.84
Missing Wealth Observations Dummy Variable 1261* 9.49 7.62* 6.50* 7.53* 0.01 3.84
Smoothed Limits with Missing Wealth Dummy 375* 9.49 7.62* 5.81* 6.58* 0.01 3.84
Average Wealth Smoothed Limits with Missing Wealth Dummy 236* 9.49 4.60* 4.27* 4.04* 0.16 3.84
Hours of Care
Missing Wealth Observations Excluded 3327* 7.81 1.82 0.52 0.64 3.84
Missing Wealth Observations Dummy Variable 15.30* 9.49 3.27 2.11 2.52 1.49 3.84
Smoothed Limits with Missing Wealth Dummy 15.29* 9.49 3.27 3.51 1.40 1.49 3.84
Average Wealth Smoothed Limits with Missing Wealth Dummy 9.49* 9.49 2.98 1.29 0.08 1.15 3.84
Notes: The joint restrictions are on income (or wealth) and income (or wealth) interacted with Medicaid limits, the presence of a medically needy program, and
a missing wealth dummy (when noted). * indicates test statistic is greater than the critical value. Critical values for joint tests with 2 and 3 degrees of freedom are
7.81 and 9.49. The critical value for one degree of freedom (for the individual test statistics) is 3.84.
Table 8: Income and Assets Lagrange Multiplier Tests
Table 8 presents the results of Lagrange Multiplier tests for each model speci￿cation. The
top panel displays the results concerning income and its interactions, while the bottom panel
displays the results concerning wealth and its interactions. For each speci￿cation, we conduct
a joint chi-square test as well as separate chi-square tests for each restriction. Collectively,
the results provide an inconsistent picture of whether including income or wealth and their
interactions would improve the ￿t of the models. For the Multiple Caregiver Model, the
results indicate that the ￿t would be improved by including income and its interactions with
the 1993 Medicaid policy characteristics: the parameter estimates associated with income
interacted with the presence of a medically needy program and income interacted with
Medicaid income limits are individually and jointly statistically signi￿cant. However, in
contrast to Gardner and Gilleskie (2009), the corresponding parameter estimates associated
with 1989 Medicaid policy characteristics are not statistically signi￿cant. For the Primary
30Caregiver Model, the parameter estimates associated with income and its interactions are
jointly statistically signi￿cant for both years. While the parameter estimate associated with
income is individually signi￿cant for both years, the policy interactions are not. Similarly,
in the Hours of Care Model, income and its interactions with Medicaid policy are jointly
signi￿cant for both Medicaid limit years. However, the interaction between income and the
presence of a medically needy program in 1993 is the only variable with an individually
signi￿cant coe¢ cient. For all three models, the parameter estimates associated with wealth
and its interactions are jointly statistically signi￿cant. An examination of the individual
restrictions suggests that wealth and its interactions are individually related to the choice of
the primary care arrangement (with two exceptions). In summary, we ￿nd weak and mixed
evidence in favor of including measures of income and wealth even when interacted with
Medicaid policy characteristics.
5.2 State-Speci￿c E⁄ects
Although our models include several market conditions and public policies in the elderly indi-
vidual￿ s or couple￿ s state of residence, the models may not capture all state-speci￿c/arrangement-
speci￿c or other state-speci￿c e⁄ects. For example, other nursing home regulations, the
supply of home health aides, or state-speci￿c variation in cultural attitudes may in￿ uence
families￿care decisions. Accordingly, our next set of speci￿cation tests concerns the pos-
sibility of state-speci￿c/arrangement-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. Using observations from states
where there is more than one elderly household, we perform Lagrange Multiplier tests to
test the null hypothesis of no state-speci￿c/arrangement-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. In particular,
we amend the baseline model in equation (1) to
y
￿




where dis is a dummy variable equal to 1 if and only if parent i lives in state s: Under the null
hypothesis, ￿js = 0 for all choices and all states s.19 The vast majority of the individual
score statistics are statistically insigni￿cant, and there is no obvious pattern associated with
those that are signi￿cant.
19 We include only states where there is more than one observation.
31Next we compare our state-speci￿c/arrangement-speci￿c score statistics for the two for-
mal modes of care to 1997 utilization rates based on data presented in LeBlanc, Tonner, and
Harrington (2000). We translate their data into log(nursing home utilization per 1000 indi-
viduals aged 70 or over) and log(number of Medicaid waivers per 1000 individuals aged 70
or over). After excluding states with missing score statistics and/or utilization rates and one
outlier,20 we use data from the remaining 31 states to compute the correlation coe¢ cients
between the score statistics and the utilization rates. For the Multiple Caregiver Model,
the correlation coe¢ cients are roughly 0:38 for nursing home care and 0:09 for formal home
health care. The correlation coe¢ cients are smaller for the other two models. These results
assuage our concerns regarding home health care usage, and we ￿nd only weak evidence that
state-speci￿c characteristics not included in our models a⁄ect nursing home usage.
5.3 Geographic Distance
Geographic distance between elderly individuals and their adult children may be endogenous.
For example, children may move closer to their parents or vice versa as their parents age or
develop health problems. For families with at least one child, Table 9 presents the overall
location transitions of children relative to parents based on the three possible responses in
AHEAD/HRS: co-residence, living within 10 miles, and living more than 10 miles away. For
each family size, the probabilities on the diagonals reveal strong persistence in geographic
distance. For example, among families where the parent and child are initially at least 10
miles apart, the proportion later co-residing ranges from 0:008 to 0:029, depending on family
size; similarly, the proportion later living within 10 miles ranges from 0:005 to 0:011.
Next we examine location transitions in response to increased caregiving needs. Table 10
displays location transitions among families where at least one child initially lives more than
10 miles from her parent(s) and subsequently co-resides with her parent(s). For each of these
families, we follow all initially distant children who provide no care in the ￿rst year until
one becomes the primary caregiver (if ever). Column (1) reports the proportion of children
who transition to coresidence with the parent among families where the parent experiences
20 We exclude Oregon because the value of log (utilization of nursing homes per capita 70 years or older)
is 6 standard deviations below the mean, whereas all other states used are within one standard deviation.
32an increase in the number of ADL problems. Column (2) indicates the proportion of those
children from Column 1 who become the primary caregiver. Columns (3) and (4) indicate
the comparable proportions among families where the parent experiences no change in the
number of ADL problems. Under the null hypothesis that changes in child location are
exogenous, we would expect the proportions in columns (1) and (2) to be small, those in
columns (1) and (3) to be similar, and those in columns (2) and (4) to be similar. For families
with one or two children, the proportions in the ￿rst two columns are statistically signi￿cantly
larger than those that would be predicted by a model with the transition rates presented
in Table 9. Also, for such families, the proportion of children who become the primary
caregiver (Column 2) is statistically signi￿cantly larger than what would be predicted by a
model where location transitions are exogenous. We ￿nd similar results corresponding to
increases in the number of IADL problems. These results suggest that location transitions
may be endogenous.
Transition Frequencies Transition Probabilities
Child Location Relative to Parent Co-resident Within 10 Farther than Co-resident Within 10 Farther than
Miles 10 Miles Miles 10 Miles
Origin of Child in Families with 1 Child
Co-resident 158 5 2 0.958 0.030 0.012
Within 10 miles 20 529 0 0.036 0.964 0.000
Farther than 10 miles 20 6 657 0.029 0.009 0.962
Origin of Child in Families with 2 Children
Co-resident 245 10 7 0.935 0.038 0.027
Within 10 miles 35 1459 1 0.023 0.976 0.001
Farther than 10 miles 46 31 2810 0.016 0.011 0.973
Origin of Child in Families with 3 Children
Co-resident 194 14 4 0.915 0.066 0.019
Within 10 miles 15 1469 0 0.010 0.990 0.000
Farther than 10 miles 31 16 2894 0.011 0.005 0.984
Origin of Child in Families with 4 Children
Co-resident 166 10 5 0.917 0.055 0.028
Within 10 miles 14 1099 0 0.013 0.987 0.000
Farther than 10 miles 16 15 2044 0.008 0.007 0.985
Table 9: Location Transitions
We observe a relatively small number of children moving from far to live with the parent
or vice versa. We are concerned, because an adult child and an elderly parent may move
closer together so that the child can take care of the parent as her health declines. In this case,
location choice would be endogenous. Table 10 presents tests of the statistical signi￿cance of
this phenomenon. For each family, all children who live farther than 10 miles and provide no
33care in year 1 were followed in each subsequent wave until one child became the primary care
provider (if ever). Columns (1)-(4) present four measures of joint dependence regarding the
proportion of children who initially live far but move in with a parent or vice versa. Column
(1) contains the proportion where the parent or the child moves after an increase in ADL
problems, and column (2) contains the proportion of those in column (1) where the child
provides care. Columns (3) and (4) are analogous to (1) and (2) without an increase in parent
ADL problems. Under the null hypothesis that child location transitions are exogenous, the
proportions in columns (1) and (2) should be small, the proportions in columns (1) and (3)
should be similar in size, and the proportions in columns (2) and (4) should be similar in
size.
Among Children Intially Living More than 10 Miles Away













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Families with 1 Child
Estimate 0.375 0.667 0.026 0.308
5% Critical Region (0.023, 1.000) (0.125, 1.000) (0.000, 0.027) (0.000,0.000)
Families with 2 Children
Estimate 0.200 1.000 0.014 0.333
5% Critical Region (0.003, 1.000) (0.017,1.000) (0.000,0.018) (0.000,0.000)
Families with 3 Children
Estimate 0.000 0.009 0.167
5% Critical Region (0.007, 1.000) (0.000,0.010) (0.000,0.000)
Families with 4 Children
Estimate 0.000 0.008 0.200
5% Critical Region (0.006, 1.000) (0.000, 0.006) (0.000,0.000)
Notes: For this analysis, the parent is the father if he is alive and the mother otherwise.
Critical regions were estimated under the null hypothesis by bootstrapping the distribution of
these statistics.
Table 10: ADL Test Results for Primary Caregiver Model
For families with 1 or 2 children, the proportions in columns (1) and (2) are statistically
signi￿cantly larger than what would be predicted in a model with location transition rates
described in Table 9. Also, for such families, the proportion of children who become the
primary care provider (Column 2) is statistically signi￿cantly larger than what would be
predicted in a model where location transitions are exogenous. We ￿nd similar results
for changes in IADLs. These results suggest that location transitions may be endogenous.
34Therefore, we construct a likelihood-ratio test to decompose the e⁄ect of location into initial
(exogenous) location and contemporaneous (possibly endogenous) location.
Restricted Estimates Unrestricted Estimates
Child Location Relative to Parent Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error
Co-resident Initial 2.257 ** 0.236 2.447 ** 0.307
Transition 2.281 ** 0.321
Within 10 Miles of Parent Initial 0.816 ** 0.177 0.876 ** 0.170
Transition 0.891 * 0.488
Wald Test: Unrestricted Initial = Unrestricted Transition 0.276 (0.869)
Wald Test: Unrestricted Initial and Transition = Restricted Initial 0.318 (0.852)
Log Likelihood -3085.4 -3058.6
Likelihood-Ratio Test 53.8 **
Notes: ** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates significance at the 10% level. The Wald
Test of Unrestricted = Restricted is conditional on the restricted estimates. P-values are in
parenthesis. The Likelihood-Ratio test statistic is distributed χ
2 with 2 degress of freedom under
the null.
Table 11: Likelihood-Ratio and Wald Tests for Location Endogeneity
Recall that our original model captures the e⁄ect of location on care provision as:
zikt6￿6 + zikt7￿7;
where zikt6 is a dummy variable that equals one if child k in family i lives within 10 miles
of the parent in year t and zikt7 is a dummy variable that equals one if child k in family i
lives with the parent in year t. To further explore the possible endogeneity of location, we
construct a likelihood ratio test to decompose the e⁄ect of location into two components: an
initial, presumably exogenous location and a current, possibly endogenous component. Here
we estimate a version of the Multiple Caregiver Model that speci￿es the e⁄ect of location
on care provision as:
zik16￿6 + (zikt6 ￿ zik16)￿6a + zik17￿7 + (zikt7 ￿ zik17)￿7a:
Under the null hypothesis that the model is correctly speci￿ed, ￿6 = ￿6a and ￿7 = ￿7a.
Alternatively, if location transitions have a di⁄erent e⁄ect on care than does initial location,
then ￿6 6= ￿6a and ￿7 6= ￿7a. As shown in Table 11, the likelihood-ratio test suggests that
we should reject the null hypothesis that the model is correctly speci￿ed, but the Wald
tests suggest we should not reject the null. However, the close proximity of the initial
35and transition parameters suggests that any endogeneity in location transitions would cause
small bias (conditional on initial location being exogenous). Thus, as long as initial location
is exogenous, we do not ￿nd strong evidence that current location is a⁄ected by potential
endogeneity issues.21
6 Conclusions
We contribute to the long-term care literature by developing and estimating three dynamic
models of families￿care arrangements for the elderly. Our dynamic framework links care
arrangements over time by allowing for true and spurious state dependence. Controlling for
observable characteristics of the potential care recipients and the potential care providers
and allowing for several types of unobserved heterogeneity, we isolate the impact of true state
dependence. In theory, state dependence could be positive or negative, depending on the
relative importance of caregiver burden and inertia. Our results provide strong evidence of
positive state dependence in care arrangements. Thus, to the extent that caregiver burnout
contributes to long-term care arrangements, its e⁄ects are dominated by inertia.
In addition, our results provide important policy implications. The e⁄ects of market
conditions and public policies on the use of formal home health care and institutional care
are smaller and less statistically signi￿cant in our dynamic model than in an otherwise
identical static model. This pattern suggests that the measured e⁄ects in the dynamic
model re￿ ect ￿ ows while those in the static model re￿ ect a stock of present and future ￿ ows.
Nevertheless, even after allowing for state dependence, families￿care decisions depend on
the cost, quality, and availability of formal modes of care.
As an early step towards understanding the dynamics of long-term care arrangements,
this work abstracts from the possibility that family members have di⁄erent preferences. In
future work, we plan to examine the strategic dimensions of long-term care decisions in a
dynamic setting. In particular, we plan to develop and estimate a dynamic game-theoretic
model by extending the static game-theoretic model developed in BGHS.
21 We also tested whether location was endogenous in the Multiple Caregiver Model. The results are
consistent with those presented here.
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